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INTllllDUCTlllN 
Deconstructing Patriarchal 
Jurisprudence in Islamic Law 
A Faithful Approach 
Azizah Y. al-Hibri 
Islamic law is viewed by the West as patriarchal, oppressive, and incompatible with 
basic Western values such as democracy and human· rights. 1 In particular, it is 
viewed as hopelessly oppressive to women.2 This attitude is partly rooted in our ig-
norance of the history of Islamic societies, especially the early ones. It is also rooted 
in our ignorance of the flexibility of and rich diversity within Islamic jurisprudence. 
To complicate matters, we are barraged in the West by news reports about oppres-
sive practices against women in Muslim countries. From these instances we hasten 
to conclude unjustifiably that Islamic law itself must be discarded if our suffering 
sisters are to find relief. 
This chapter will show that this conclusion is both unwarranted and unworkable. 
Briefly, it is unwarranted because it attributes to Islamic law problems that arise as 
a result of patriarchal local customs and patriarchal judicial perspectives. We can-
not simply make these problems disappear by blaming them on Islamic law itself. 
They are just as likely to arise under a secular legal regime, and must be confronted 
directly. The conclusion is also unworkable because most Muslim women are seri-
ous about their religion and prefer to solve their problems from within that frame-
work. So long as Muslim women are led by patriarchy to believe that their oppres-
sion was divinely decreed, they will hesitate to change the status quo, as oppressive ~sit may be. Therefore, it is important to unmask the patriarchal assumptions lurk-
ing within present laws in Muslim countries, and to reveal them for what they are, 
neither divine nor condoned by the Divine. 
1 (
Reprinted by permission from 12 American University Journal of International Law and Policy 
1997). 
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Additionally, attempts to encourage Muslims to discard their religion are viewed 
in Muslim countries with extreme suspicion. They seem to continue in a new guise 
the concerted efforts of Western colonialists to achieve similar results in the last 
century. Not only was colonialism instrumental in weakening Muslim societies, it 
also played a very important role in the West. As a result of the colonialist heritage, 
Western views of Islam have been based on the works of Orientalists and Neo-Ori-
entalists who built whole careers on "interpreting" Islam to the West.3 Some suc-
ceeded in their endeavor, but most were unable to escape their culturally and reli-
giously biased perspectives. Their conclusions unavoidably reflected these perspec-
tives and resulted in a highly negative and distorted view of Islam. 
The typical Orientalist view of Muslim women pictures them as passive, op-
pressed, and confined to the seraglio.4 This theme has been circulated in the United 
States for at least two hundred years.' It can be argued that its most recent formula-
tion uses the language of international instruments and universal human values. A 
prime example was offered by the Fourth World Conference on Women, held in 
Beijing, China. There, the Platform for Action originally contained language incon-
sistent with Islamic Shari'ah (basic law).6 When the discussion of that language 
reached the floor, Muslim delegates refused to accept it, stating repeatedly that they 
regarded the law of God as superior to the law of the United Nations.7 
This, then, is the crux of the issue: Is Islamic law oppressive to women? Further-
more, if the West believes it is, should it accept the religious choices of Muslim 
women, or should it liberate them against their own will? Because of limitations of 
space, this chapter will address the first question only. The second question is quite 
important; a positive answer to it underlines further the patriarchal/patronizing at-
titude adopted by the West generally, and the feminist movement specifically, to-
ward Muslim women. We now turn to a quick introduction to Islamic law. 
ISLAMIC LAW AND CUSTOM 
To understand Islamic law, we need to understand its basic principles and its rela-
tion to local custom. Islamic law is based on Islamic shari'ah, which in turn is based 
on the Qur'an, the revealed word of God. To the extent that Qur'anic verses may 
need further illumination, Islamic shari'ah is also informed by the sunnah (life, 
words, and example of the Prophet Muhammad). Both sources are supplemented 
by ijtihad (juristic interpretation of text) whenever necessary, and by other sources 
of Islamic jurisprudence, such as ijma' (consensus) of the Muslims. Today there are 
five major schools of ijtihad. They are the Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Ja'-
fari schools. All these schools were established between the seventh and eighth cen-
turies A.D. 
Ijtihad is open to all qualified Muslims, whether male or female. The qualifica-
tions concern the knowledge of the mujtahid (one engaging in ijtihad) of the 
Qur'an, the sunnah, important commentaries, and other related works. 8 They also 
concern the mujtahid~s piety and fairness. 9 Furthermore, since it is a basic jurispru-
